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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In 2015, for the first time in history, a party filed a counterclaim challenging 
state-held copyright protection of annotated codes in court.1  The annotations 
of state codes are specifically grouped portions of judicial decisions relating to a 
specific code section that identify how courts have interpreted the statutory text 
in practice.  To state supporters (supporters of copyright protection), copyright 
protection ensures the integrity of invaluable legal research aids by assuring 
compensation for those creating annotations.  For challengers (public access 
supporters), prohibiting public access to annotated codes is a violation of a 
basic constitutional right to knowledge of the law.  At the center of the two 
arguments is one fundamental issue: what makes up the law?   
Notably, in May 2016, both parties to the aforementioned Georgia suit filed 
for summary judgment on the notion that there is no genuine issue of material 
fact.2  If the court determines the issue the way my research leads me to believe 
that it will, both motions should be rejected.  To accept that there is no genuine 
dispute of material fact is to ignore the central issue of this case: whether the 
annotations are “the law.”  The parties disagree on this central element and 
should have the chance to take their case to a Judge or Jury.  The parties are 
awaiting the court’s decision in spring of 2017.  If the court rules that one of the 
two motions be granted, then I assert that the court has erred in the sense that 
it will have essentially foregone due process for efficiency.  This is a case that 
should go before the court for the fact-finder to determine whether the 
annotations are part of “the law.”3   
If the substantive case reaches the court and the supporters of copyright 
protection win in the current Georgia case, more than half of the States will be 
affected and could face future litigation.  While states will be judged on a case-
by-case basis, the decision in the pending Georgia case can drastically influence 
the future of state-held copyright to annotated codes.  
                                                                                                                  
 1 Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim of Defendant Public Resource.Org, Inc., 
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 1:15cv2594 LEXIS, at *1, Doc. 16 (N.D. 
Ga. 2015). 
 2 See generally Defendant Public.Resource.Org, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, 1:15cv2594 
LEXIS, at *1, Exhibit 4, Doc. 29-2 (N.D. Ga. 2015); Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support 
of Its Motion for Summary Judgment, Code Revision Commission v. Public.Resource.Org, 
1:15cv2594 LEXIS, at *1, Exhibit 4, Doc. 30-1 (N.D. Ga. 2015).    
 3 Bill Donahue, Georgia Law Annotations Copyrightable, LAW360 (Mar. 27, 2017, 1:52 PM), https:// 
www.law360.com/articles/906378/georgia-law-annotations-copyrightable-court-says. 
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As of 2011, approximately twenty-eight states required courts to reference 
copyrighted official codes.4  As of 2014, two states alone, Montana and Illinois, 
had state statutes outlawing the copyright protection of state primary code 
material.5  After legislative hearings in Oregon, cases regarding primary 
materials in California, and constitutional analysis, the Supreme Court ultimately 
held that states may not hold the copyright to their statutory codes.6  However, 
many states still hold copyrights to their official codes by asserting that the 
annotations of the codes are subject to copyright protection.  
There are two ways states hold copyright to annotated codes.  First, state 
legislators or staffers may create the annotations granting the author, the state, 
the copyright.  Second, the state may create a work-for-hire contract with a 
private company, such as LexisNexis or Westlaw.  A work-for-hire contract is a 
written contract by which the private company gains profits for their work in 
exchange for the state holding the copyrights to the annotations.  
Notably, there are areas other than annotated codes where states have been 
granted copyright protection of government-created and work-for-hire 
products.  For example, the State of Florida holds the copyrights to 
Florida.Org, a government-created website that helps individuals find particular 
agencies or online government services.7  Additionally, in County of Suffolk v. First 
American Real Estate Solutions, the Second Circuit found that counties, like states, 
can hold the copyright to their tax maps created in a work-for-hire contract.8  
This Note seeks to identify whether states can constitutionally hold 
copyright to annotated codes either as authors or through work-for-hire 
contracts.  First, this Note will review the background of copyright law as it 
applies to copyright of state primary law.  Second, this Note will analyze the 
arguments set out by supporters and rejecters of copyright protection for state 
annotated codes.  Third, this Note will delve into the ideological question at 
hand and why defining the term “law” is the root of the entire issue.  Following, 
this Note will explain different theoretical approaches to defining “the law.”  
                                                                                                                  
 4 National Conference of State Legislature, State Statutes/Code: Holder of Copyright (Mar.–July 
2011), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/Copyright_Statutes.pdf (surveying and explaining that 
out of the thirty-two states that responded to the survey, twenty-eight had copyrighted official codes, 
many of which likewise held official code annotations subject to copyright). 
 5 CoCommonLaw, States Who Assert a Copyright in State Statutes (July 23, 2014), http://cocommo 
nlaw.com/2014/07/states-assert-a-copyright-state-statutes/ (stating that by 2014 Montana and 
Illinois were the only two states that outlawed the right to copyright state law material). 
 6 See, e.g., Veeck v. S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 539 
U.S. 969 (2003). 
 7 MyFlorida.com, http://www.myflorida.com/myflorida/copyright.html (last visited Jan. 3, 
2016). 
 8 See Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 17, 188 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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When applicable, the Note uses the current Georgia case as an analogy to 
explain the application of the analysis in a work-for-hire scenario and the 
Oregon case for application of the analysis to circumstances in which legislative 
staff create annotations.  Finally, this Note explains why the court is currently 
more likely to find in favor of the state where the state holds copyright to its 
annotated code through a work-for-hire contract but not in a case where the 
state legislative staffers create the annotations. 
II.  COPYRIGHT LAW PERTAINING TO STATE PRIMARY LAW 
Copyright law originates in Article I of the United States Constitution and 
has been amended, narrowed and broadened through legislation and 
interpretation.9  The Patent and Copyright Clause of the United States 
Constitution grants the national legislature the power to protect works of art 
and science for those who created them.10  The purpose of the clause is “to 
encourage people to devote themselves to intellectual and artistic creation,”11 by 
offering guaranteed protection of their creative works.  
By the necessary and proper clause,12 Congress has the power to pass 
legislation for the purpose of facilitating constitutional copyright in arts and 
sciences.  In so doing, Congress passed the Copyright Act of 1909 and later the 
Copyright Act of 1976.  Throughout the amending of the Copyright Act, 
Congress has not added any explicit language regarding state government 
works.   
The lack of explicit language has not stopped the Court from interpreting 
the statute to apply to states at least in some instances.  For example, courts 
have long held that the law of the land is not protected under the Copyright 
Act, regardless of whether the land in question is a state and not the country as 
a whole.13  That fact, however, is not founded upon the text of the Copyright 
Act.  Instead, it is a prime example of statutory silence suggesting a lack of 
statutory authority.  
There are a few sections of the Copyright Act of 1976 that are vital to 
understanding the issue that this work intends to resolve.  Section 105 of the 
                                                                                                                  
 9 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 10 Id. (“To promote the progress of Science and the useful Arts, by securing for limited Times 
to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 11 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 555 (1972). 
 12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting the power to do what is necessary and proper to 
enforce the U.S. Constitution to the U.S. Congress). 
 13 See ROBERT BRAUNEIS & ROGER E. SCHECHTER, COPYRIGHT: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 
(INTERACTIVE CASEBOOK SERIES) 593 (2012). 
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Act exempts works created by the federal government from receiving copyright 
protection.14  Section 105 is important because it, along with Section 101, 
prohibits the federal government from copyrighting its laws, codes, or judicial 
opinions.15  Notably, section 105 does not expressly prohibit copyright 
protection for products created for the federal government through work-for-
hire agreements with private entities.16 
Section 105 is also silent on state governments’ authority to copyright legal 
materials.17  In fact, no section of the copyright act precludes states from 
copyrighting works of their own government.18  However, courts have 
determined through precedent and interpretation that, like the federal 
government, “states [too] cannot claim copyright in primary legal materials such 
as judicial opinions and statutes.”19  The finding is largely based in due process 
under the Constitution because access to primary law is considered a 
fundamental right. 
In 1992, the House of Representatives heard member Barney Frank’s push 
to amend section 105 of the copyright act, but his amendment was never put to 
a vote.20  Frank’s proposed amendment, H.R. 4426, could have prohibited the 
copyright protection of official state codes.21  The proposed amendment 
focused on compilations of law or legal materials such as judicial opinions and 
was novel in that it explicitly prohibited state governments from holding 
copyrights to compilations of their laws or judicial opinions.22  The amendment 
was never voted on. 
                                                                                                                  
 14 Irina Y. Dmitrieva, State Ownership of Copyrights of Primary Law Materials, 23 HASTINGS COMM. 
& ENT. L.J. 81, 82 (2000) (referencing 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2000 Supp.)). 
 15 15 U.S.C. § 290e(a) (2012) (identifying an exception to § 105 of the Copyright Act of 1976 
which allows the Secretary of Commerce to “secure copyright and renewal thereof on behalf of 
the United States . . . in . . . standard reference data”). 
 16 17 U.S.C. § 105 (2012). 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Dmitrieva, supra note 14, at 82. 
 19 BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 589; see Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. 244, 253–
54 (1888). 
 20 Katie Fortney, Ending Copyright Claims in State Primary Legal Materials: Toward an Open Source 
Legal System, 102 LAW LIBR. J. 59, 65 (2010) (citing H.R. 4426, 102d Cong. (1992)). 
 21 Id. 
 22 H.R. 4426, 102d Cong. (1992). H.R. 4426 never came to a vote before Congress adjourned 
at the end of the session.  It was never brought before Congress again.  At the very least, the 
passing of the bill would have made the argument stronger that states cannot copyright the 
annotations to state codes.  However, it would not explicitly deny the annotations per se.  If the 
annotations are derivative works versus compilations, H.R. 4426, while broad, was not broad 
enough to expressly deny copyrights to the materials. 
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Similarly, in 2014, Carl Malamud appeared before the United States House 
Judiciary Committee to push elimination of state copyright in official legal 
works.23 Specifically, he pushed to add “the edicts of government . . . are not 
copyrightable for reasons of public policy” to the Copyright Act.24  No 
amendment was added pertaining to his testimony.25  No similar amendment 
has ever been voted on in Congress. 
Section 101 defines terms within the Copyright Act.26  Section 101 defines a 
derivative work in part as “[a] work consisting of editorial revisions, annotations 
[to a pre-existing work] . . . which, as a whole, represent an original work of 
authorship. . . .”27  The annotations of state codes take pre-existing judicial 
decisions and compile them in a new way to explain how statutory codes have 
been interpreted.  
Also notable is section 103 of the Copyright Act of 1976.  Section 103 
allows copyright protection for derivatives and compilations.28  It is important 
because the focus of this Note is not whether a state may copyright its code 
sections per se.  Instead, the focus is on whether a state can copyright the 
annotated version of its code.  Namely, are the annotations themselves 
protectable under the Copyright Act of 1976.   
Since section 103 holds that derivative works and compilations are 
protectable under copyright law, without the section, there would be no option 
to copyright a work, such as the annotations to an official code, which is made 
up of pieces of other works that may not otherwise be subject to copyright.29 
Derivatives and compilations under the Copyright Act are fairly similar; they 
rearrange existing ideas into a new product.  Both are copyrightable if they 
reach the requisite minimum creativity.  Compilations can become derivatives if 
                                                                                                                  
 23 Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim of Defendant Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 
Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 1:15cv2594 LEXIS *1, Doc. 16 (N.D. Ga. 
Oct. 22, 2015). 
 24 The Scope of Copyright Protection: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intel. Prop., and the Internet of 
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014) (video clip beginning at 41:51), https://archive. 
org/details/gov.house.judiciary.20140114.   
 25 Id. 
 26 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2015). 
 27 Id.; see, e.g., Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 674, 680 (2d Cir. 1998). 
 28 17 U.S.C.A. § 103 (LexisNexis 1978). 
 29 Deborah Tussey, Owning the Law: Intellectual Property Rights in Primary Law, 9 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 173, 192–93 (1998) (referencing 17 U.S.C.A. § 103 (quoting 17 
U.S.C.A. § 101 (defining derivative works as “ ‘a work consisting of editorial revisions, [or] 
annotations . . . which, as a whole, represent an original work of authorship’ ” and compilations 
as a work resulting “from ‘a process of selecting . . . and arranging previously existing materials of 
all kinds . . .’ ”))).    
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the product “sufficiently transform[s] the underlying data,” although doing so is 
not necessary to qualify for copyright protection.30 
Since Banks v. Manchester, judicial opinions are not subject to copyright 
protection.31  The Banks court held that judicial opinions as a whole cannot be 
copyrighted because they are binding law governing the people as precedent.32  
Further, the court held that “whatever work the judges perform in their official 
capacity cannot be regarded as authorship under the copyright law.”33  Since 
Banks, copyright protection has been interpreted to exclude “ ‘the law’ whether 
articulated in judicial opinions or legislative acts or ordinances . . . .”34   
So far, no court has ever ruled on whether or not states are allowed to hold 
the copyrights to their respective annotated codes under the Copyright Act or 
the Constitution.  Since many states claim copyright of the annotated versions 
of their codes, and Georgia has become the first state to file a claim against 
infringing on such a copyright, the issue is of particular importance.  This Note 
seeks to answer the question of whether or not states have the right to do so. 
III. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION ARGUMENTS 
A court has never decided or heard evidence as to whether a state can hold 
the copyright to the annotations of its official codes.  While some states have 
avoided litigation by allowing websites such as Public.Resource.Org to 
reproduce their annotated codes for free, many states have continuously 
requested unauthorized publishers to remove their official codes from free 
access sources.35  
On July 25, 2015, the State of Georgia filed a claim against Carl Malamud 
for copyright infringement of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, 
O.C.G.A.  The State of Georgia argues in the claim that while the code itself is 
                                                                                                                  
 30 Id. at 194. 
 31 128 U.S. 244 (1888). 
 32 Id. at 293–94 (holding that Ohio Supreme Court judicial opinions could not be protected 
under copyright law).  
 33 See BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 593. 
 34 Id.; see Veeck v. So. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l, Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 798 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. 
denied, 539 U.S. 969 (2003) (holding that Veeck did not infringe on copyright because the code it 
published was enacted into law beforehand). 
 35 R. Robin McDonald, Public Records Group Countersues Georgia in Copyright Fight, DAILY REP. (Sept. 
23, 2015), http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202737942438/Public-Records-Group-Georgia-
in-Copyright-Fight?slreturn=20160004125807 (explaining Idaho, Mississippi, and Oregon have all 
asked Carl Malamud to take down their codes from Public.Resource.Org as well).  (Twenty-six states 
have asked for copyrights to at least a portion of their code section.) 
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not subject to copyright, the annotations of the code are.36  This is the first time 
a state has ever filed a claim against an unauthorized publisher of a state 
annotated code.  Georgia claims that the unannotated code is available to the 
public free of charge and the public does not have the right to free access to the 
annotations.37  The arguments Georgia and other copyright protection 
supporters have for allowing copyright of annotations of the codes have four 
major components.  
A.  SILENT PERMISSION 
The first argument for copyright protection of annotated codes is text based; 
there is nothing in the Copyright Act prohibiting it.  In Suffolk, a Second Circuit 
Court stated that the text of the Copyright Act permits the governments to 
have copyright over its own works by leaving out a limitation on state 
governments.38  Supporters of state copyright protection view the annotations 
as derivative works acting as a research guide.  To that extent, the annotations 
are covered by the Copyright Act as long as they fulfill the requirement of an 
original work.39 
Section 102 of the Copyright Act of 1975 requires a work be original for 
protection under the Act.  The term itself is vague, but has largely been defined 
through common law.  Today, the Court requires “a modicum of creativity” for 
purposes of fulfilling the originality requirement.40 
In Feist, the Supreme Court held that a compilation of purely factual material 
such as phone numbers and addresses could not be protected under copyright 
because the work did not satisfy the “minimum constitutional standard” for 
originality.41  In American Registry of Radiologic Technologists v. Bennett, a fifth district 
court held that an entire test and the questions individually can be protected 
under copyright.42  While simple compilations of facts are not protected under 
the act, the American Registry court found that the questions themselves were 
more creative than mere compilations of facts, and compilations of facts that 
                                                                                                                  
 36 Complaint & Cease and Desist, Code Revision Commission Et Al v. Public.Resource.Org, 
Inc., 1:15cv2594 LEXIS *1, Exhibit 4 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
 37 See id. 
 38 Cnty. of Suffolk v. First Am. Real Estate Solutions, 261 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 39 See infra note 44. 
 40 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991).  
 41 Id. at 364 (explaining that a phone book was not protected under the Copyright Act even 
though the work was not copied from another because the “respondent has not selected, 
coordinated, or arranged the uncopyrightable facts in any original way”). 
 42 Am. Registry of Radiologic Technologists v. Bennett, 939 F. Supp. 2d 695, 702–03 (W.D. 
Tex. 2013). 
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are placed together in a way that is minimally creative could fall within the realm 
of copyright-ability.43  
To be original, a work need not be novel. In Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown 
Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc.,44 the Second Circuit Court used a three-prong 
test to determine whether originality existed.  The Court held that a work could 
only be protected under copyright law if the three prongs were met; to wit:   
(1) the collection and assembly of preexisting data;  
(2) the selection, coordination, or arrangement of that data; 
and  
(3) a resulting work that is original, by virtue of the 
selection, coordination, or arrangement of the data contained in 
the work.45 
In Key, the Court found that some phone books could reach the prerequisite 
requirement of originality under the Copyright Act.46 
The term “original” has been interpreted to also mean that the work is not 
copied from another author.  Prong four, as I refer to this interpretation for the 
purposes of this Note, is a more commonsensical requirement that, that which 
is copyrightable is not plagiarized.  That is, that the author must have put his or 
her own effort or mark into a finished product.47  A product cannot be copied 
completely from another author and granted protection under the statute.  To 
be original in the context of the Copyright Act, then, both interpretations must 
be satisfied. 
Using the annotations of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, the works 
easily satisfy the test provided by the Second Circuit.  While judicial opinions 
are not subject to copyright, case outcomes are not necessarily exempt from 
protection.  In the Georgia case for instance, the annotations restate case 
outcomes without reproducing the judicial opinion as a whole. Supporters of 
copyright protection do not contend that the judicial opinions or even the case 
                                                                                                                  
 43 Id. 
 44 945 F.2d 509, 509 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 45 Id. at 512. 
 46 Compare id. at 515 (explaining that the arrangement of businesses into categories and the 
selections of businesses was enough creativity to allow copyright of the compilation), with Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (holding that the arrangement of a 
phonebook by alphabetical order is not enough creativity for copyright protection).  It should be 
noted that the two cases are not in conflict, and show creativity exists in compilations somewhere 
between alphabetical listing, which I assert is similar to a timeline, and selecting of certain 
businesses and dividing them up into certain categories.  
 47 BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 63. 
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outcomes themselves are subject to copyright, but that the exact annotations, 
the exact compilations of case outcomes, as they appear in and relate to state 
codes are subject to copyright.48  Further, like the compilation in Key, and unlike 
in Feist, the O.C.G.A. annotations are often divided into different issues, and 
the judicial outcomes are selected and placed into the different issue 
categories.49 
The first prong of the Second Circuit test is fulfilled because the annotations 
are largely made up of short explanations of pre-existing judicial opinions 
collected by independent research on the part of LexisNexis.  The second 
prong is satisfied because the judicial decisions are arranged by how they reflect 
portions of respective code sections which is, at the very least, arguably as 
creative as arranging exam questions in a specific way and more creative than 
alphabetizing names.50  The third prong is not an issue either because the 
annotations themselves are different from any other published annotations 
corresponding to Georgia’s code sections.  The annotations are not plagiarized, 
so the fourth prong is not an issue for purpose of defining original.  While this 
test is not analyzed in much depth, the standard, again, is only a “modicum of 
creativity,” meaning that this is a low hurdle for the State to get over. 
The annotations undoubtedly reach the minimal creativity standard of 
copyright protection under Feist and Key.  In analogizing the Second Circuit’s 
opinion on copyright of maps in Streetwise, facts, such as judicial opinions and 
cases, may not reach the level of creativity themselves, but the way in which the 
judicial opinions or case outcomes are summarized and compiled can.51  
The importance of the originality test in this area of law is simple.  While 
public access supporters argue that meeting the threshold level of originality is 
insufficient for the purposes of copyright protection because of the Due 
Process Clause of the Constitution, supporters of copyright protection disagree.  
                                                                                                                  
 48 Suffolk, 261 F.3d 179, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2001) (explaining that under the Copyright Act the 
claim of infringement was valid as long as FOIL was not violated.  FOIL is beyond the scope of 
this Note and is irrelevant to the conclusion.  It is merely a specified New York law mentioned in 
the Suffolk case.). 
  See supra note 22.  Had H.R. 4426 been enacted or Malamud’s push for an amendment 
succeeded, the circumstances could be different, but again, the bill was never voted on and is 
therefore a moot point in this analysis. 
 49 See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) (2015) (showing annotations which have judicial outcomes 
divided into different issues relevant to the ambiguities within the statute); see also supra note 46 
and the analysis following.  
 50 Compare supra note 40, with supra note 42. 
 51 Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 747–48 (2d Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
while physical facts on a map are not subject to copyright, the colors used on the map can meet 
the creativity requirement to allow copyright protection). 
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Supporters of copyright protection find that because of the silence of the 
Copyright Act on annotations of state codes, as long as the annotations reach 
the threshold level of creativity, states may hold the copyright.  Further, if 
annotations are written purely in chronological quotes of judicial opinions or in 
alphabetic order, unlike the case in Georgia, annotations may fail to meet the 
threshold level of creativity.  If the annotations in question fail to meet the 
requisite level of creativity, the analysis stops there and the state may not hold 
copyright to the annotations under the law.  Originality, therefore, is a central 
point for analyzing copyright protection of annotated codes even though it does 
not prohibit protection for the Georgia Code specifically. 
B.  ECONOMIC INNOVATION ARGUMENT 
A second argument in favor of copyright protection for annotated codes 
centers on profit bred innovation.  The economic innovation argument 
contends that without copyright protection, private annotators will have no way 
to make money for their creations and therefore have no incentive to continue 
creation of the valuable resource.52 
No one could produce equivalently enforceable codes and statutes if the 
statutes and codes were protected through copyright.  Conceptually, however, 
anyone can do research and create annotations based on publically available 
judicial opinions.  As long as the judicial opinions are applied accurately, 
someone else’s annotations may well be as useful as those produced by another 
entity.  Copyright of annotations protects only those specific annotations, not 
the ability to create annotations using similar judicial opinions and code 
sections.53 
The economic innovation theory encapsulates the notion that entities, 
private or public, will only create the annotations when the “difference between 
the expected revenue and the cost of the duplication of the work exceeds the 
cost of creation” the original author(s) endured in creating the annotations in 
the first place.54  The implication being that if a secondary entity grants public 
                                                                                                                  
 52 See Fortney, supra note 20, at 66. 
 53 See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954) (“Copyright protects originality rather than 
novelty or invention — conferring only the ‘sole right of multiplying copies.’  Absent copying 
there can be no infringement of copyright.  Thus, [the copyright owners] may not exclude others 
from using statuettes of human figures in table lamps; they may only prevent use of copies of 
their statuettes as such or as incorporated in some other article.” (citing Jeweler’s Circular Pub. 
Co. v. Keystone Pub. Co., 281 F. 83, 94 (2d Cir. 1922))). 
 54 Claudia Schmidt, Is Copyright Protection Necessary to Promote Innovation?, International Association 
for the Advancement of Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property (Nov. 13, 2007), http://www.atrip. 
org/Content/Essays/Claudia%20Schmid.pdf.   
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access to the original annotated work, the entity creating the work will gain no 
profit and therefore receive no incentive to continue quality production. 
The strongest counterpoint to the economic incentive argument in the 
annotated code scenario is that profit and incentives, such as the first mover 
advantage, still exist without copyright at all.55  The theory considers the idea 
that people inevitably seek to obtain the original form and not a duplicated 
form of a work, think of original versus copied artwork for instance, resulting in 
profit for the original author.56  
However, the economic access argument ultimately cuts in favor of the 
copyright protection advocates.  Notably, the second producer of the official 
annotated codes is not seeking profit from the reproduction.  The non-profit 
nature of the republication means that as soon as the second group publishes an 
exact copy of the original work, the authors of the original annotations may see 
little to no profit of their work.  Copyright protection supporters may therefore 
have a strong argument that because of the lack of profit after the non-profit 
group republishes the entire original annotated code, the entity creating the 
original annotations will lose the incentive to create, harming the future of the 
valuable resource. 
C.  AVAILABILITY OF UN-ANNOTATED CODE 
Additionally, supporters of copyright protection believe that the 
identification of the for-profit annotated code as the official, and only official, 
state code is insufficient to prove that the annotations are part of the law and 
therefore not subject to copyright protection.  The title of official does not itself 
mean there is misuse of copyright.  LexisNexis has the exact version of the 
code, which exists with the annotations, online for free without the 
annotations.57  
This argument is best analyzed through looking at the O.C.G.A.  The code 
sections of the free un-annotated code correspond correctly and are updated to 
reflect the precise code sections of the annotated official code.  For example, 
O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1(c) states: “Any person restrained of his liberty as a result of a 
sentence imposed by any state court of record may seek a writ of habeas corpus 
to inquire into the legality of the restraint.”58  The unannotated version of § 9-
14-1(c) reads exactly the same.59  
                                                                                                                  
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 See LEXISNEXIS, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
 58 O.C.G.A. § 9-14-1(c) (2015). 
 59 Compare id. (annotated version), with id. (unannotated version). 
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Further, the unannotated version tells the reader which citation to use.  The 
citation is still to the O.C.G.A. as the words in the code section are exactly the 
same.  The code also shows the history of the section.  The only difference is 
the lack of annotations.60  
The above point is critical for analyzing whether the annotations are subject 
to copyright and should be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.  If a state updates 
the unannotated version and makes sure the unannotated version reflects the 
annotated version verbatim, as Georgia does, then it is worth it to continue on 
through an analysis to determine whether copyright protection is constitutional 
and statutorily appropriate.  However, if the unannotated version is 
exceptionally difficult to obtain, does not reflect accurately the annotated 
version of the code, and/or bares a separate citation than the annotated code, 
copyright protection of the annotated code is more than likely a violation of the 
constitution.  
D.  HISTORICAL CONSISTENCY/PROGRESS ARGUMENT 
Another factor cutting in favor of copyright protection supporters is an 
argument of historical consistency/progress.  The argument focuses on the pre-
internet world where the legality of copyrighting annotations of state official 
codes was never challenged.  Official annotated codes were bound into books 
and sold throughout the mid-to-late 1900s, but until the books became available 
over the Internet as a result of the digital age, the legality of the copyrighted 
annotations were not at issue.61   
Conventional wisdom holds that if no problem existed with profiting from 
annotated codes before use of the internet, private annotators will stop using 
the internet to provide access to the good in order to avoid legal trouble.62  
Copyright law exists to promote advancement of knowledge.63  Those 
supporting copyright protection argue that allowing free public access could in 
turn limit progress.  As stated in the constitution, the purpose of copyright law 
is to “Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”64 and access to 
                                                                                                                  
 60 Compare id. (annotated version), with id. (unannotated version). 
 61 See E-Mail from David A. Collins, Dir., Product Planning, Eastern U.S. Codes and 
International Primary Law, LexisNexis, to Mark S. Thompson, Account Exec. & Research 
Attorney, LexisNexis, forwarded to Shellea D. Crochet, Law Student, University of Georgia 
School of Law (Jan. 8, 2016, 3:33 PM) (on file with Shellea Crochet: crochesh@uga.edu) 
[hereinafter E-Mail from David A. Collins, to Mark Sebastian Thompson]. 
 62 Jessica Litman, Revising Copyright for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 32 (1996). 
 63 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.  The exact phrase as stated later in this paragraph is to “Promote 
the Progress of Science and the useful Arts,” which I assert is essentially promoting knowledge. 
 64 Id. 
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technology advancement, not public access to the annotations themselves, is 
mandatory to achieve such progress.  
The historical consistency/progress argument is strong for copyright 
protection supporters.  However, there is a valid counterpoint.  Public access 
supporters can argue, that while annotated codes were produced before the 
digital age, the digital age brought to light an ongoing constitutional violation 
and did not create a new one.  Further, as technology increases, copyright law 
must change to effectively deal with the issues present.65 
Ultimately, the historical consistency argument cuts in favor of those 
supporting copyright protection because the argument against conventional 
wisdom is largely non-judiciable in nature.  It is the duty of the legislature, not 
the court to change the current law in order to update it to reflect societal 
advancements.  Two states as of 2014 have outlawed copyrighting of annotated 
codes through the law-making process.66  Therefore, at least two states, the only 
two states to outlaw copyrighted annotations, find the issue a political one 
versus a judiciable one.  The court is likely to find its job is to identify how the 
law currently stands on the issue of copyrighting annotated codes and not how 
the law should be changed. 
Notably, the above paragraph says “the court is likely to” and not “the court 
will.”  The final outcome still depends on whether or not the court finds the 
annotations as part of the law.  If the annotations are enforceable as the law, 
then the constitution trumps the above analysis and the annotations should not 
be subject to copyright protection.  However, if the annotations are not 
enforceable as the law, the above analysis cuts strongly in favor of the 
supporters of copyright protection.  
IV.  PUBLIC ACCESS ARGUMENTS 
Carl Malamud, the leader of PublicResource.Org, has become a major face 
in fighting copyright of annotated state codes.  He has successfully argued 
against copyright of official codes in the past and is now focused on the 
annotations.  Supporters of his view have multiple arguments for outlawing the 
practice of copyrighting annotated codes centered on the value of public access.  
                                                                                                                  
 65 See Litman, supra note 62, at 26–27. 
 66 See CoCommonLaw, supra note 5. 
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A.  SILENT PROHIBITION 
Public access supporters argue that, as a general rule, silence on a matter is 
not indicative of legislative intent.67  The Supreme Court has held that in order 
for silence on a specific action within a statute to imply legality of that specific 
action, there must be extenuating circumstances beyond those occurring in this 
instance.68  To show that silence yields permission, the party attempting to 
show such must prove that prohibiting copyright protection has been proposed 
and turned down on numerous occasions during various congressional sessions 
to win.   
In Bob Jones University, the Court held that silence in a statute was an explicit 
permission of an action.  Bob Jones University was an exception to the general rule 
because legislation against the IRS’s interpretation of a congressional statute 
had been debated and proposed thirteen times in Congress and each time 
rejected alluding to congressional rejection of the IRS’s interpretation.69   The 
issue as to copyright of state code annotations, on the other hand, has been 
debated only twice in congress as a proposed amendment and has never gone 
to court.70  There is virtually no similarity between the two cases, meaning that 
copyrighting state annotated codes is subject to the general rule that silence 
does not imply permission. 
Views favoring copyright protection argue silence as indicative of intent in 
two ways.  First, the Copyright Act itself does not expressly prohibit what state 
governments have done in this scenario.  Second, when proposed with the 
opportunity to amend the copyright in a way which could influence the issue, 
Congress never put the proposal to a vote.71  The argument ultimately cuts 
against those favoring copyright protection because the amendment itself was 
only proposed once and, as a general rule, silence in a statute does not imply 
permission. 
Silence does not necessarily prohibit copyright protection, but it does take 
away supporters’ argument that silence explicitly permits protection.  While 
silence does not necessarily cut in favor of the public access supporters, it is an 
                                                                                                                  
 67 John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture into 
“Speculative Unrealities,” 64 B.U. L. REV. 737 (1984). 
 68 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2032 (1983) (stating “courts are slow to 
attribute significance to the failure of Congress to act on particular legislation”). 
 69 See id. at 2032–33. 
 70 See supra notes 22, 24. 
 71 See supra notes 22–23.  See H.R. 4426, 102d Cong. (1992); Answer to Amended Complaint 
and Counterclaim of Defendant Public.Resource.Org., supra note 23. 
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important argument because it stops the supporters of copyright protection 
from winning on a silent permission argument.  
B.  FAIR USE DOCTRINE 
Another statutory argument public access supporters rely on is the fair use 
doctrine.72  Codified in § 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976, the fair use doctrine 
allows public access to fact and decision summaries of judicial opinions and 
makes musical parodies and classroom lectures legal.73  There lies a Public 
Access argument that like classroom lectures, publicizing the annotated codes 
promotes an informed society through non-profit seeking and therefore non-
discriminatory methods.  
Federal courts look to the four factors of § 107 to analyze whether a use is a 
fair use as protected under the Act.74  The factors are: 
1.  the purpose and character of the use, including whether 
such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit 
educational purposes; 
2.  the nature of the copyrighted work; 
3.  the amount and substantiality of the portion used in 
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
4.  the effect of the use upon the potential market for or 
value of the copyrighted work.75 
To argue fair use, all four prongs must be analyzed using an approach similar to 
totality of the circumstances.76   To win on a fair use argument, supporters must 
                                                                                                                  
 72 See Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim of Defendant Public.Resource.Org., 
supra note 23. 
 73 U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright. 
gov/fair-use/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2016); Measuring Fair Use: The Four Factors, STANFORD 
UNIVERSITY LIBRARIES, http://fairuse.stanford.edu/overview/fair-use/four-factors/ (last visited 
Nov. 17, 2016); Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–77 (1994). 
 74 See U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, supra note 73 (stating the four factors look at amount 
copied, the way the copied material was transformed or used, the potential economic effect of the 
use, and the nature of the original work).  
 75 17 U.S.C.S. § 107(1)–(4) (approved 2015); see, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 
487 F.2d 1345, 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973) (showing an example of how the different elements are 
analyzed with a specific set of facts). 
 76 See Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Ltd. P’ship, 619 F.3d 301, 313 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994) (explaining the fair use test as a test 
in which “the results of every factor’s analysis are weighed together in determining whether there 
is fair use”)). 
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show that the nature of the annotations requires public access to the entirety of 
the state codes and annotations.77  
Under the first prong, courts typically look for a transformation of the 
copyrighted work in question.  In Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Limited Partnership, 
the court found that where the Baltimore Raven’s logo was used as another 
team’s logo, the purpose was substantially similar to the original use.78  Since the 
logo was used as an identical sports logo for another team, the work was not 
transformed, going against the likelihood of the court ruling the use of the logo 
as a fair use.79  
Like Bouchat, in the case of reproducing a state annotated code, there is also 
no transformation.  The original annotated code is reproduced as an identical 
document for people to rely on as an official annotated code.  Therefore, the 
lack of transformation of the original document cuts against public access 
argument in regards to annotated codes as it did to sports logos in Bouchat. 
Under the second prong, reproducing state annotated codes is more likely 
covered under fair use than is the reproduction of sports logos under Bouchat.80  
For the second prong, the court looks to the nature of the original work.  Most 
notably, if the work is published and reproduced for the public good, the court 
tends to be more lenient.81  Reproduction of an annotated legal code is done, 
according to public access supporters, solely for the public good.82  Therefore, 
prong two cuts more in favor of reproduction as a fair use of the work.  
Under the third prong, the public access supporters have a tough argument 
to make.  Courts look for the extent to which the copyrighted product is taken 
verbatim.83  The court typically only allows fair use arguments to succeed when 
the product reproduced is not taken in its entirety.84  In the case of publishing 
free state annotated codes, publishers are taking the entire document without 
                                                                                                                  
 77 George Carr, Copyright Misuse: An Overview, Litigation News: Intellectual Property Litigation, A.B.A., 
https://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/practice_areas/072810-intellectual-property 
-copyright-misuse-overview.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2016).  (The test itself is not the central 
argument of this Note, so I summarize what the supporters of fair use in this instance need to prove 
for a successful case.) 
 78 Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 313. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See generally id. 
 81 See U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, supra note 73. 
 82 See generally Defendant Public.Resource.Org, Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 2. 
 83 See U.S. Copyright Office Fair Use Index, supra note 73. 
 84 See Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014). 
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transforming any details.85  Therefore, the third prong also cuts against the 
public access supporters’ fair use argument.  
The fourth prong is arguably the most important and scrutinized prong.  
The Seventh Circuit has a standardized approach to the prong: if a work is used 
as a substitute for the copyrighted work, it is not a valid fair use under the 
doctrine.86  The purpose of the prong is to protect the original creator’s profit 
from his/her copyrighted material but allowing others to create derivatives or 
complements to the work.   
In cases of republishing a state’s copyrighted annotated code, there is no 
question as to whether the copy of the work is intended as a substitute of the 
official code.  It is an exact replica of the work, and the purpose is to allow those 
who cannot afford the work to circumvent the cost.  Further, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia has held that if a plaintiff can 
show that the allegedly infringing product could breed customer confusion as to 
which is the original piece, that is enough to win on the fourth prong.87 
In a parade of horribles approach, taking the code in its entirety and giving it 
to the public for free may result in no future purchasing of the original 
documents and no compensation for the original authors.  Copyright protection 
supporters have a better argument here.  If the court looks to the standard 
§ 107 prong test presented above, then the court is likely to find no valid fair 
use argument. 
Notably, though, fair use issues are determined on a case-by-case basis.88  A 
case about the publishing of a copyrighted annotated code for purposes of public 
access has never come before a court.  It is not a given that the case will be 
determined by quasi-bright line rules and common law.  However, the copyright 
holder has a strong argument against fair use regardless of factors in § 107. 
C.  DUE PROCESS 
Where the Copyright Act may allow protection for certain works, 
substantive due process may preempt.  Those supporting public access argue 
                                                                                                                  
 85 Compare the publication of the entire state annotated codes, available at http://www.LexisNe 
xis.com, with Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 75B.  
 86 See Kienitz, 766 F.3d at 758 (stating that the Seventh Circuit looks at “whether the contested 
use is a complement to the protected work (allowed) rather than a substitute for it (prohibited)” 
(citing Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002))). 
 87 CCA & B, LLC v. F + W Media Inc., 819 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1315 (N.D. Ga. 2011) (holding 
that the plaintiff publisher could have won if it had “met its burden of showing a substantial 
likelihood of such consumer confusion”). 
 88 Bouchat, 619 F.3d at 308 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)). 
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that the annotations are part of the Official Code and therefore are part of the 
public domain as the law of the state.89 
1.  Copyright Misuse.  One due process argument rests with copyright misuse 
doctrine. Copyright misuse is an affirmative defense to copyright infringement 
used when the amount of copyright protection claimed is “contrary to public 
policy.”90  The portion of the misuse doctrine that is most applicable in cases of 
state annotations is an argument that the material is “at least partially in the 
public domain.”91  The public access argument here relies on the annotation as 
part of the law and therefore within the public domain.  
The misuse doctrine is typically used for noncompetition/monopoly 
copyright claims.92  Supporters of copyright protection have a rebuttal to the 
misuse doctrine argument; they are not claiming that others cannot create 
annotations based on the same judicial opinions, just that the annotations as 
they appear are not to be plagiarized.  Further, supporters of copyright 
protection argue that the code itself only, and not the annotations, is within the 
public domain.  Therefore, public access supporters have a tough argument to 
make for copyright misuse. 
Additionally, a problem exists with testing whether or not annotated codes 
monopolize judicial opinion citations.  According to The Bluebook, A Uniform 
System of Citation, legal citations to Georgia code sections, and most other states’ 
codes, must use an annotated version of the code be it LexisNexis or Westlaw.93  
The citations dictated by the unannotated version are the same citations 
dictated by the annotated version.94  Therefore, it cannot be determined 
through the citations alone as to whether or not judicial opinions cite to the 
annotated or unannotated version of the code.  If an individual cannot afford to 
pay for LexisNexis or Westlaw codes, that individual must cite to the official 
code without access to the code he or she is citing to.  The Bluebook notates 
that citing to the official code, only, is sufficient, making a copyright misuse 
argument that much more difficult for public access supporters. 
2.  Introduction of Substantive Due Process.  Due process in the scenario of access 
to state annotated codes is best understood by looking at the indigent 
defendant.  The public access argument is not focused on those who can afford 
                                                                                                                  
 89 See Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim of Public.Resource.Org., supra note 23. 
 90 Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls. v. Princeton Review, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 2d 11, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2004); 
see Carr, supra note 77. 
 91 See Carr, supra note 77. 
 92 Id. 
 93 See THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION 258 tbl.T.1 (Columbia Law Review 
Ass’n et al. eds., 20th ed. 2015). 
 94 See id. 
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the annotated code but on those who cannot.  The argument holds that the 
indigent, pro se defendant, who only has access to the unannotated version is at 
a disadvantage because he or she does not have the same information going 
into a trial or hearing as do those with enough money to purchase the annotated 
version.  The copyright protection is therefore discriminatory against those in 
lower socioeconomic standing. 
As will be discussed later, the due process argument also involves another 
issue.  Because socioeconomic classes are not traditionally protected classes, the 
substantive due process analysis comes down to whether access to the 
annotations is a fundamental right.  Ultimately, public access supporters believe 
access is a fundamental right and copyright protection cannot overcome strict 
scrutiny.95 
D.  PRIMARY PURPOSE ARGUMENT  
The primary purpose of copyright protection is not about protecting the 
author’s right to compensation as much as it is about promoting innovation and 
creativity.96  When protection is given to the state for its annotated code, 
innovative and novel approaches to the law are arguably hindered in the 
courtroom.  Supporters of public access could argue that indigents have less of 
an ability to create compelling arguments because of inefficient research 
without the annotations. 
Although a possible argument, this is not the argument that the public 
access supporters necessarily want to rely on. Supporters of copyright can easily 
argue the opposite: equal access to annotations inhibits innovation by giving 
everyone involved the same starting point for research.  Furthermore, before 
annotations existed, people still won cases by using effective arguments. 
E.  WORK-FOR-HIRE VERSUS STATE ACTION 
Although no case focusing on copyrighting annotated codes has gone before a 
state or district court, debate has occurred at the state level.  Two states have 
outlawed copyrighted annotated codes altogether, and Oregon’s legislature has 
backed off its desire to copyright annotated codes.97  Oregon argued for 
                                                                                                                  
 95 See supra pp. 142–43.  
 96 Functions of the Copyright Office, United States Copyright Office: A Brief Introduction and History, UNITED 
STATES COPYRIGHT OFFICE, http://copyright.gov/circs/circ1a.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2016). 
 97 See Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim of Defendant Public.Resource.Org, 
supra note 1; Defendant Public.Resource.Org., Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 
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copyright of state code annotations largely on the basis of accuracy.98  Ultimately, 
the legislature backed off of copyright infringement claims to avoid litigation.  
The Oregon case differs from the Georgia case in that legislative staffers created 
Oregon’s annotations whereas a private company created Georgia’s annotations 
through a work-for-hire contract.99  The distinction between Oregon and Georgia 
will be important in future litigation.  If annotations are created by legislative 
staffers rather than through a work-for-hire contract with a private company, then 
there is a larger state action problem at issue. 
As will be discussed later, the central question is whether the annotations are 
part of the law.  In a work-for-hire contract, as done in Georgia, the 
annotations are more easily separated from the legislative process than 
annotations written by the staffers, as was the case in Oregon, because a third-
party creates them.100  Because work-for-hire contracts are more easily separated 
from the lawmaking process as set forth through state and federal constitutions, 
the issue is better for analyzing deeper.  
The state action problem, meaning the fact that state workers themselves are 
creating the annotations, in situations such as was the case in Oregon, leads to a 
more difficult distinction between what is the law and what is an annotation.  
Therefore, the court is ultimately less likely to find copyright protection for 
annotations created by legislatures, such as those in Oregon, than annotation 
created through work-for-hire contracts, such as those in Georgia. 
V.  GETTING TO THE FUNDAMENTAL ARGUMENT 
All arguments presented for and against the copyright protection of state 
code annotations center around a single, fundamental disagreement.  Both sides 
have persuasive arguments as long as their definition of “law” is correct.  As a 
black letter rule, the law itself “is in the public domain” and is not protected 
under copyright.101  Neither side disagrees with the bright-line rule.102  Rather, 
                                                                                                                  
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 2; Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 2. 
 98 See State Statutes/Code: Holder of Copyright, supra note 4; CoCommonlaw, supra note 5. 
 99 See generally Beth Ford, Open Wide the Gates of Legal Access, 93 OR. L. REV. 539, 539 (2014); see 
also Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, 
Inc., 1:15cv2594 LEXIS *1, Doc. 11 (N.D. Ga. 2015). 
 100 Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, 
Inc., 1:15cv2594 LEXIS *1, Doc. 11 (N.D. Ga. 2015) (explaining the work-for-hire contract 
between LexisNexis and the Georgia Code Revision Commission). 
 101 See Fortney, supra note 21, at 68. 
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the sides disagree on whether the annotations themselves are law.103  Therefore, 
the one major issue is whether the annotations themselves are law. 
If the annotations are part of the law, then supporters of public access can 
win on a due process argument.  Courts have long held that primary law itself is 
not protected under the Act.104  Importantly, defining the law as encompassing 
annotations eliminates the possibility that the private entity or the state can hold 
the copyright.  Therefore, if the annotations are relied upon as law, the 
supporters of public access win. 
If the annotations are not part of the law, the copyright protection 
supporters can win on a statutory claim.  The annotations meet that standard of 
minimal creativity and can be protected as derivatives or compilations under the 
statute.105  Further, there is likely no fair use exception for annotated state codes 
as those using it use the entire document without any changes.106  On the basis 
that the annotations are merely guidelines to help with research, states and 
copyright protection supporters win. 
There are different theoretical approaches for determining what makes up the 
law.  As will be examined, one theory may lead to the state winning this argument 
and one may lead to the public access supporters winning the argument. 
VI.  WHAT IS THE LAW? 
A.  TEXTUALISM 
“Were the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of 
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be 
the legislator.”107  I reference this quote because I think it encapsulates perfectly 
                                                                                                                  
 102 See Answer to Amended Complaint and Counterclaim of Defendant Public.Resource.Org., 
Inc., supra note 23, at *22 (explaining that the state agrees that laws are not subject to copyright 
protection). 
 103 Compare Defendant Public.Resource.Org., Inc.’s Memorandum of Law in Support of Its 
Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 2, with Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Its Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 2.  
 104 See BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 593. 
 105 See Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (discussing modicum of 
creativity standards). 
 106 See Answer to Amended Complaint & Counterclaim of Defendant Public.Resource.Org, 
Inc., supra note 23, at *5. 
 107 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts 
in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values Delivered at 
Princeton University (Mar. 8–9, 1995), UNIVERSITY OF UTAH 85, http://tannerlectures.utah.edu/ 
_documents/a-to-z/s/scalia97.pdf (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 326 (James Madison) 
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
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the textualist perspective.  Textualists hold that while common law is good and 
not an infringement on the separation of powers, common law should be held 
for what it is, adjudication.108 
The idea is that a court, an adjudicative body, takes a case at its specific 
facts.  How the law applies to that set of facts should therefore be limited to 
those specific facts.  In that sense, the common law is limited because in reality, 
every case differs to a certain degree.  No case is binding, and every case can be 
compared and contrasted with every other case.  
Further, common law is by nature ex post facto in that the judgment comes 
after the violation has occurred.109  If the judgment is suddenly construed as a 
generalized law, the Constitution in violated and separation of powers is 
ignored.  
For example, in using the O.C.G.A. for misdemeanor possession of 
marijuana, the statute states, “it is unlawful for any person to purchase, possess, 
or have under his or her control any controlled substance.”110  From a textualist 
perspective, the meaning of the statute is straightforward and needs no 
annotation to define it.  
First, the textualist principle starts with the text itself.  The idea is that the 
text itself is the best way to examine the legislative intent with the law.  If there 
are no ambiguities, then the analysis is done and facts fit either within or 
without the law.  
In looking at context clues, the word “possession” is largely clarified.  By using 
the words “possess, or have under his or her control . . .,” the legislature shows 
that possession does not mean “have under his or her control.”111  If the terms 
meant the same thing, the statutory language would be superfluous.112  Therefore, 
under a textualist argument, possession must mean something broader—that an 
individual can be guilty of possession without necessarily holding marijuana in his 
or her hand.  “Possession” has a spectrum of meaning, as do most words.  From 
a textualist perspective, still, there need not be any more information given than 
the facts of the case and the text of the statute; if an analysis “goes beyond that 
range” of possibilities, the interpretation is impermissible.113 
                                                                                                                  
 108 See id. at 85–86. 
 109 See id. at 86. 
 110 O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30(a) (2015). 
 111 Id. 
 112 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND 
RECENT TRENDS (2014). 
 113 See Scalia, supra note 107, at 99. 
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Textualists look at an “objectified intent” and not a subjective one.114  The 
subjective alternative, Scalia says, “is simply incompatible with democratic 
government” because it expects the common citizen to understand a legislator’s 
mindset rather than to comprehend what was actually portrayed in the text of 
the statute.115  The point is that a judge and jury need look at how a common 
individual reasonably could interpret the statute and not how a scholar in the 
field would analyze it.116 
1.  Applying Textualism to Annotated Codes.  Under a textualist approach, 
annotations of state codes are subject to state copyright protection.  A textualist 
perspective holds that the code sections themselves are the law and that the 
annotations are mere derivatives compiling and analyzing common law 
adjudications to explain how courts have applied the law in certain sets of 
facts.117  Textualists more than likely see the incorporation of annotations into 
the law as dangerous.  They share the idea that common law adjudications are 
individualized decisions not to be generalized into a binding rule.118  Doing so 
could create confusion and reliance on that which does not determine the 
outcome of a case.119 
Further, textualists believe that whether or not it is good law to have 
annotations protected by copyright is up to the legislature; it is not up to the 
court to determine what the legislature intended for this presumably 
unanticipated issue under the copyright act.120  The courts must interpret the 
law in the context of the constitution and the facts.121  This is not to negate that 
a new law may be better or that federal or state subsidies could grant access 
while still providing private authors with funds.  Rather, this illustrates that 
judges have only the authority to interpret what is in front of them; the rest is 
left for the legislature.122  
                                                                                                                  
 114 Id. at 92. 
 115 Id. 
 116 See id. at 99; Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (stating statutory terms “ought to be determined . . . on the basis of which meaning is 
(1) most in accord with context and ordinary usage . . . and (2) most compatible with the 
surrounding body of law . . .”). 
 117 See Scalia, supra note 107, at 89 (stating “[b]efore the wish becomes a binding law, it must be 
embodied in a bill that passes both Houses and is signed by the President”). 
 118 Id. at 85–86. 
 119 Id. 
 120 See id. at 97–98. 
 121 See generally, id. 
 122 See id. at 98; see also Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980) (explaining the issue of whether a 
right or choice “warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer”).  Here, the 
choice is whether to prepare well for a trial or hearing with the help of privately created annotations. 
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As the legislature proposed an amendment in 1992, it can again.  If the 
judgment leads to what is not the intention of the legislature, subjectively, the 
legislature has the power to change the law.  As long as what is before the court 
is not prohibited under the Copyright Act as it is written currently, and that 
non-prohibition is not contrary to any portion of the Constitution, the court 
must allow copyright protection for annotations of state codes. 
Notably, the outcome under a textualist approach could be different in 
situations where the annotations are created through a work-for-hire contract 
than where they are instead created by a state legislature.  In the later instance, 
such as was the case in Oregon, the same body tasked with creating and passing 
the law is the body creating the annotations and holding the copyrights.123  
While the annotations are compilations or derivatives or judicial opinions, once 
they are fit together to justify a law by the legislature, they arguably become the 
objective intention of the legislature.  On the other hand, where there is a work-
for-hire contract, the annotations are creations of a private company.124  The 
private company creates and is paid for the annotations; the state may fact 
check the citations, or perhaps only hold the copyright.   
Under textualist analysis, legislature/legislative staff-created annotations may 
be per se unconstitutional.  The only way for legislature-created annotations to 
be valid under state constitutions is for the annotations to go through the same 
process as a bill goes through to become a law.125  Once the annotations go 
through the specified process as dictated through the respective state 
constitution, then the annotations become law.  Such annotations are not 
subject to copyright protection.126  However, under a textualist approach, 
                                                                                                                  
 123 See Scalia, supra note 107, at 89 (stating “[b]efore the wish becomes a binding law, it must be 
embodied in a bill that passes both Houses and is signed by the President”).  The argument here 
is that the more the creation of the annotations resembles the passing of a law within the 
legislature, the stronger the argument that the annotations are part of and treated as the law itself. 
 124 Proposed Brief of Amicus Curiae Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., In Support of Plaintiff 
at 2-6, Code Revision Comm’n v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 1:15cv2594 LEXIS, at *1, 
Document 38 (N.D. Ga. 2015), https://docs.justia.com/cases/federal/district-courts/georgia/ga 
ndce/1:2015cv02594/218354/38 (explaining the work for hire contract between the State of 
Georgia and LexisNexis).  It should be noted that at times the annotations are edited for accuracy 
by outside Georgia Legal Analysts.  This is an insubstantial fact as far as analyzing whether or not 
the annotations are part of the law.  However, if the stated editors are/were members of the state 
legislature, that fact could substantially alter the analysis of whether or not the annotations are 
part of the law.  
 125 At the federal level, the prerequisites are bicameralism and presentment.  The same is true in 
most instances at the state level.  However, interpretations of what the terms mean vary slightly 
from state to state.  Since there is not one particular mechanism, this portion of the analysis is 
purposefully left broad. 
 126 See BRAUNEIS & SCHECHTER, supra note 13, at 589. 
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annotations created through a work-for-hire contract with a private company 
are not the law and are therefore protectable under the Copyright Act as long as 
they meet the requisite standard of creativity. 
2. Equal Protection Clause.  Another route to understanding the textualist 
frame is in the rational basis test under the equal protection clause because the 
textualist perspective realizes no fundamental right or protected class at issue in 
the matter of copyrighting annotated codes.  In this analysis the textualist 
assumption holds that the annotations are not the law and access to them is 
therefore not a fundamental right as protected under the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.127  The issue of limited access to annotations 
created by a private entity is purely an economic one.  The group of people 
discriminated against in that regard is the lower socio-economic classes, the 
indigent defendants, who cannot afford an attorney or access to the 
annotations.  Under the Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause, the 
impoverished class is not considered a protected class.128  Further, this is a 
neutral regulation, as it does not directly prohibit a specific class from accessing 
the annotations, so in order to get out of rational basis territory, there must be 
intent and purpose on the part of the state to discriminate against the class.129 
The intent and purpose of the copyright is to allow Lexis to recoup its 
publication and research costs.  While public access supporters may argue there 
is discrimination here, effect is not enough and under the textualist approach, 
the appropriate standard of review is, therefore, rational basis.130 
The rational basis test is extremely deferential.131  States could likely sustain 
the rational basis test in arguing only that there are limited state funds available 
and they are necessary elsewhere.132  Perhaps, the state could even win on the 
basis that the private entity must be funded in some way. 
Because there is limited information on the subject matter, as the issue has 
never gone before a court, there is more work to be done in the future.  To 
have a satisfactory rational basis test, the state must explain the basis for 
keeping the law the same.  Georgia, for instance, seems to hold that the rational 
basis is to fund the private entity (LexisNexis) who authored the work.  But the 
explanation does not explain why the state rather than LexisNexis should hold 
the copyright to the works.  
                                                                                                                  
 127 See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938). 
 128 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.   
 129 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 229 (1976). 
 130 See, e.g., McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 279 (1987). 
 131 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478 (1977). 
 132 See id. (explaining that use of public funding in a different constitutional way is enough to 
satisfy the extremely deferential rational basis test). 
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The take home message is that if the annotations are not “the law,” then 
states producing annotations through a work for hire contract have a good 
chance of overcoming the rational basis test.  While all individuals have a right 
to a fair trial and counsel, the state is not obligated to provide the resources 
needed for efficient research.133  If the annotations are considered research 
guidelines, then there should be no duty to provide access to all helpful 
documents, just the code itself and judicial opinions.  Therefore, if the 
annotations are not “the law,” then states may receive copyright protection for 
the annotated codes created and published by a third party.  
B.  FIT AND JUSTIFICATION 
The overarching purpose of fit and justification is to figure out a resolution 
to a certain set of facts that not only fits the legal landscape but also creates the 
best legal landscape possible.  In a case before a judge or multiple judges, the 
role of the court is to interpret the law and apply it to the facts at bar.  As 
Sunstein explains, that is not a simple determinacy of reading a statute and 
applying it.  Instead, courts fit particular facts into the legal landscape and then 
choose one of several/a few possible outcomes by justifying the solution that 
gives the law the most integrity.134   
Supporters of public access, which may win under a fit and justification 
approach, strive for “maximum access to the law.”135  Striving for maximum 
access is striving for a big picture of the law as it stands.  Dworkin theorizes that 
the law goes beyond mere statutory language because legislatures cannot possibly 
imagine every instance to which the law may need to be applied.136  Instead, it is 
up to the judge to fit the facts into the world of the law and justify his decision as 
if each possible outcome could be the next chapter in a chain novel of law but 
one possible outcome would make the novel the best it can be.137  
Dworkin would argue that the code sections “include [generalities] that 
invite moral reasoning from judges” to apply the law to the cases in front of 
them.138  For example, in Georgia, the statutory code section regarding 
                                                                                                                  
 133 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 335 (1963). 
 134 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, There Is Nothing that Interpretation Just Is, DIGITAL ACCESS TO SCHOLARSHIP 
AT HARVARD 1, n.*, https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstrem/handle/1/16145974/interp8_30.pdf (last 
visited Oct. 18, 2016) (expanding CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS: WHY 
THE FOUNDING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 19–33 (2009)). 
 135 See Fortney, supra note 21, at 67. 
 136 See Sunstein, supra note 134, at 10–11. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. at 10. 
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misdemeanor possession of marijuana does not define “possession.”139  The 
annotations below the section on the annotated LexisNexis official code clarify 
what evidence is sufficient to prove possession.  For instance, the annotations 
explain when proximity to marijuana is and is not enough to show possession 
beyond a reasonable doubt.140 
Under a fit and justification analysis, the annotations are part of the law 
because they fit a single code section into the landscape of the law.  Without the 
annotations, it is not clear what the statute means or where the current facts 
land in the spectrum of the law.  For an indigent defendant without access to 
the annotations, it is not clear that he or she could be charged with possession 
without having the marijuana in his or her hand at the time of arrest.  
Therefore, under Dworkin’s fit and justification analysis, the annotations are 
part of the law and should not be subject to copyright protection. 
The analysis for equal protection or due process is unnecessary using a 
Dworkinian approach.  Both sides concede that it is settled that the law is not 
subject to copyright protection.141  Assuming annotations are part of the law, 
the analysis ends.  
VII.  ANALYSIS 
A.  DEFINING “THE LAW” 
A “statutes alone” definition is too narrow a definition of law.142  Courts 
have held that laws, whether streaming from judicial opinions or statutory 
codes, are not subject to federal copyright protection because they are law.143  
However, Veeck also notes that building codes, like statutes, become the law 
once enacted.  The question is whether a work-for-hire contract can bring about 
law created by a third party.144  Since the law was defined there as including 
                                                                                                                  
 139 O.C.G.A. § 16-13-2(b) (2015). 
 140 Id. (looking at the annotations on LexisNexis copyrighted material which compare Kier v. 
State, 663 S.E.2d 832, 832 (Ga. App. 2008) (explaining when proximity to marijuana is not 
enough to show possession), with Davis v. State, 607 S.E.2d 924, 924 (2004) (explaining when 
proximity to marijuana is enough to show possession).  
 141 1-5 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 5.12 (2015).  
 142 See supra note 33. 
 143 Tim Armstrong, Can States Copyright Their Statutes?, INFO/LAW (Apr. 16, 2008), https:// 
blogs.law.harvard.edu/infolaw/2008/04/16/can-states-copyright-their-statutes/ (citing Veeck v. 
S. Bldg. Code Cong. Int’l Inc., 293 F.3d 791, 180 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc)). 
 144 Id. 
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judicial opinions, a general rule throughout the United States today, courts do 
not limit law to that which is passed as a bill through the legislature.145  
Like judicial opinions, annotations shape the way statutory codes are read in 
the context of specific sets of facts.  Unlike judicial opinions, there is no 
evidence published that annotated codes are cited to in court cases as relied 
upon law.  Future research could shed light on this aspect.  Notably, however, 
the cases in the annotations tend to be landmark decisions often cited as 
precedent in judicial opinions.  Ideally, future research should focus on whether 
the citations to cases exist because they are in annotations or because they refer 
to landmark cases that simply happen to be in annotations.146  Evidence that in 
a majority of cases the opinions cited to are those in the annotations could 
result in a determination that the annotations are more than a mere research 
guideline and are actually part of the laws.  Since the research is yet to be done 
and highly complex, it is important to note that just because the evidence is not 
published yet does not mean it is non-existent.  Therefore, it would be foolish 
to conclude that that annotations are not the law and end the analysis there.  It 
is best to analyze further at a more neutral level.  The rest of the analysis will 
not rely on any one theoretical prospective as correct.  Instead, the issue will 
focus on how a due process claim would/could result from both angles and 
propose a way to resolve the issue without having to determine whether the 
annotations are part of the law. 
B.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
The question for the substantive due process analysis is whether state-held 
copyright to annotated codes infringe on the constitutional rights of the citizens 
within the state.  There are multiple possibilities for the outcome of a substantive 
due process analysis for the issue.  In analyzing each way, we will look first to 
whether the right is fundamental and second to the states’ interests in the matter.  
The first question is whether or access to annotated codes is a fundamental 
right.  Those supporting a public access theory would say undoubtedly yes.  The 
                                                                                                                  
 145 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 141 (explaining that law created through a work for hire 
agreement is not an exception to the general rule that the law is not subject to copyright protection).  
 146 See, e.g., Kennedy v. State, 277 Ga. 588, 588 (2004) (standing as a landmark case in felony 
murder law in Georgia cited in twenty-one other cases and located in an O.C.G.A. annotation).  
Compare O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 (Supp. 2006), and O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 (2007), with O.C.G.A. § 16-5-1 
(2003) (showing that the first time the 2004 case was published in the O.C.G.A. was in 2006).  See 
Ward v. State, 292 Ga. 637, 640 (2013); Chapa v. State, 288 Ga. 505, 507 (2011).  But see Folson v. 
State 278 Ga. 690, 694 (2004) (showing citations to the Kennedy case in court opinions occurred 
both before and after the case was published in the annotations of the O.C.G.A.).  
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reasoning behind this conclusion is that annotations are part of the law and that 
procedural due process requires all individuals to have adequate notice of the law.  
If there is a fundamental right to access of the annotations, then the court 
will apply strict scrutiny.  To overcome strict scrutiny, the state must have a 
compelling interest and the copyright of the annotations must be a narrowly 
tailored to meet a compelling state interest.147  Keeping taxes low to protect 
political candidates does not rise to the level of a compelling state interest.148  
Therefore, nothing states have argued thus far seems to satisfy a strict scrutiny 
test.  Under a strict scrutiny analysis, the public access supporters would likely 
win. 
There are other ways besides ideological interpretation of what makes up the 
law to determine whether access to the annotations is a fundamental right.  
Some judges look further than the text of the Constitution to history and 
tradition to find fundamental rights.149  Cutting in favor of copyright 
supporters, history has shown that until the digital media age the legality of 
copyright protection for state annotated codes were not challenged.  Georgia 
first published copyrighted annotated codes in 1935 and involved LexisNexis 
beginning in 1978.150  Around 1992, the codes were published online.151  It was 
not until approximately thirteen years after LexisNexis granted access to the 
annotated code online for a fee that the first challenge against state-copyrighted 
annotated codes was filed in 2015.  Therefore, history and tradition do not 
support a conclusion that access to annotated codes is a fundamental right. 
From the perspective of copyright supporters, the issue has not changed and 
the problem has not changed; the only difference is the medium.  If no problem 
of access to the law existed because of copyrighted annotations since they 
began, there should not be a problem now.  Therefore, there is no reason it 
should be treated any differently than if the annotations were still only 
published in book form.  If the Court accepts this argument, then access to the 
annotated codes is not a fundamental right. 
                                                                                                                  
 147 Health and safety have been held to be compelling state interests; however, avoiding a raise in 
taxes for political purposes is not a compelling state interest.  See JAMES A. KUSHNER, GOVERNMENT 
DISCRIMINATION: EQUAL PROTECTION LAW AND LITIGATION § 4.27 (2016–2017 ed.).  
 148 See Commonwealth v. Suplee, 387 A.2d 85, 91–92 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (stating “protecting the 
reputation of candidates for public office is clearly not a compelling state interest” (citing N.Y. 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 722 (1964))); see also Leger v. Sailer, 321 F. Supp. 250, 252 (E.D. 
Pa. 1970) (explaining “saving or preserving public funds — is not compelling” specifically when 
balanced with “the severity of the deprivation imposed upon the excluded group”). 
 149 See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 304 (1990); Moore v. East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
 150 E-Mail from David A. Collins, to Mark Sebastian Thompson, supra note 61. 
 151 See id. 
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If access is not a fundamental right, then the appropriate test is a very 
deferential, rational-basis test.  The state interest for protection could be paying 
the creators of the annotations back for their work by allowing them to sell the 
material.  The Court would ultimately defer to the states in such a scenario. 
However, it may not be so cut and dry.  Courts tend to lean more towards 
indigents when money stands as a barrier to a significant benefit.152  This is where 
the analysis gets interesting.  Even if the Court holds, as those arguing for 
protection believe, that the right to annotations is not a fundamental one, the 
court may apply a heightened standard.  The Court tends to apply intermediate 
scrutiny to classes such as gender and sexual orientations that may not reach the 
level of protected class but have still faced discrimination in the past.153  Although 
it may not reach strict scrutiny, there is a good argument for it being some form 
of intermediate scrutiny between rational basis and strict scrutiny.  
With this potential increase in scrutiny, the Court should look to a two-part 
analysis.  First, the Court should look to the means and the ends and decide 
whether the means are reasonably calculated to reach the goal.  The first prong 
is largely a recap of the rational basis test.  Whether the right at issue is a 
fundamental one is irrelevant for the purposes of the analysis of the first prong.  
The questions for the prong would be: (1) What is the state interest? And (2) 
How does the copyright protection allow the state to obtain the interest?154  
The state interest is accurate annotations to facilitate legal research.  The 
interest is obtained through copyright protection because the protection allows 
the authors of the annotations to receive compensation for their work. 
Therefore, the first prong cuts in favor of copyright supporters. 
In the second prong, the Court should look to reasonable alternatives for 
how to reach the goal.  The second prong leans more toward the strict scrutiny 
approach, but does not go so far as to say that a viable alternative avoiding the 
usurpation of the right will always override the route chosen to achieve the 
state’s goal.  Instead, it looks to available alternatives and how those alternatives 
burden the state.  If the alternatives burden the state any more than the option 
chosen, then the Court should lean more towards deferring to the state on the 
second prong.  
                                                                                                                  
 152 See, e.g., Leger, 321 F. Supp. at 252. 
 153 Brett Snider, Challenging Laws: 3 Levels of Strict Scrutiny Explained, FINDLAW (Jan. 27, 2014, 
9:05 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/law_and_life/2014/01/challenging-laws-3-levels-of-scrutin 
y-explained.html. 
 154  See id. (explaining the intermediate scrutiny approach as determining the existence of an 
“important government objective” and whether the state action “substantially related to achieving 
the objective”). 
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Consider the second prong a sliding scale between rational basis and strict 
scrutiny.  To clarify the analysis, look at the pending Georgia case.  Georgia 
holds the copyright to provide the private annotators payment for their work.  
The state may have other reasons for doing so, but regarding the information 
currently available, this is the primary reason.  
There are two conceptually simple alternatives.  First, Georgia could open 
access, completely eliminating the copyright protection, and raise tax revenue to 
fund the private company.  Raising taxes is burdensome on the state by forcing 
political change and forcing those who may never use the goods to pay for 
them via tax dollars.  Therefore, the alternative is not a viable one. 
Second, Georgia could change the agreement they have with LexisNexis to 
allow LexisNexis to hold the copyright and sell its product.  Allowing 
LexisNexis to hold copyright could eliminate the legal issue, but it would not 
satisfy public access supporters.  Without the state-held copyright, it is a much 
harder argument to make that the annotations are the law.  True public access 
supporters would be unsatisfied with the alternative because if annotations are 
not the law, they may receive copyright protection.  With a lack of viable 
alternatives, the second prong also cuts in favor of copyright protection 
supporters. 
Ultimately, using a sliding scale approach and a history and tradition analysis 
to the due process issue, the state may have a better argument over all.  
However, if the court finds that the annotations are explicitly the law, the issue 
could change.   
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The first major distinction this Note makes is between annotated codes 
made through work-for-hire contracts and those created by legislative staffers 
and legislators.  From both a textualist and Dworkinean perspective, where 
legislative staffers and legislators create annotations for state codes, the state 
may not hold the copyright to the code.  
For work-for-hire contracts granting the state the copyright and the private 
entity the profit, the question is more complex.  Under the textualist 
perspective, states have a strong argument that they can hold copyrights to their 
annotated codes.  Under the Dworkinean approach, the annotated codes are 
not subject to copyright protection even under a work-for-hire contract.  Both 
perspectives agree that annotations created by legislative staffers are not subject 
to state copyright protection but disagree on how to handle situations where a 
work-for-hire contract exists between a state and a private entity. 
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Determining whether the annotations are part of the law will determine the 
future of copyrighting annotated codes.  Rejecting the theory that annotations 
are part of the law through a textualist perspective, the state wins as long as 
unnannotated versions of the code are free, reliable, and accessible, and as long 
as the annotations reach the threshold level of creativity.  Where the court takes 
a Dworkinian approach on the other hand, the annotations are not subject to 
copyright.  If the annotations are part of the law, and the law cannot be 
copyrighted without infringing on the constitution, then the annotations cannot 
be copyrighted.  
As the law currently stands, the supporters of copyright protection will likely 
win where a state holds copyright to annotations that reach the threshold of 
creativity through a work-for-hire contract.  Analyzing through a rational basis 
and proposed intermediate scrutiny test, copyright protection supporters win.  
Only under strict scrutiny do the public access supporters win.  Subjecting the 
case to a strict scrutiny approach is to express one ideology and subjecting the 
case to rational basis analysis is to accept an alternative ideology.  To avoid 
becoming a political/ideological body versus a neutral decision maker, the court 
should apply an intermediate approach looking at means end analysis and viable 
alternatives.  In an intermediate approach, copyright supporters likely win.  
In the end, the subject of state-held copyright of official annotated codes is 
one that will continue to be scrutinized as more challenges come to light.  The 
law has room to change and room to grow.  Ultimately, as the law stands today, 
copyright protection supporters will likely win as long as the circumstances are 
substantially similar to that of the Georgia case and an unannotated version is 
accurate and available to the public. 
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